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Abstract
Background: The human mating system is characterized by bi-parental care and faithful monogamy is highly
valued in most cultures. Marriage has evolved as a social institution and punishment for extra pair mating (EPM) or
adultery is common. However, similar to other species with bi-parental care, both males and females frequently
indulge in EPM in secrecy since it confers certain gender specific genetic benefits. Stability of faithful monogamy is
therefore a conundrum. We model human mating system using game theory framework to study the effects of
factors that can stabilize or destabilize faithful committed monogamy.
Results: Although mate guarding can partly protect the genetic interests, we show that it does not ensure monogamy.
Social policing enabled by gossiping is another line of defense against adultery unique to humans. However, social
policing has a small but positive cost to an individual and therefore is prone to free riding. We suggest that since
exposure of adultery can invite severe punishment, the policing individuals can blackmail opportunistically whenever
the circumstances permit. If the maximum probabilistic benefit of blackmailing is greater than the cost of policing,
policing becomes a non-altruistic act and stabilizes in the society. We show that this dynamics leads to the coexistence
of different strategies in oscillations, with obligate monogamy maintained at a high level. Deletion of blackmailing
benefit from the model leads to the complete disappearance of obligate monogamy.
Conclusions: Obligate monogamy can be maintained in the population in spite of the advantages of EPM.
Blackmailing, which makes policing a non-altruistic act, is crucial for the maintenance of faithful monogamy.
Although biparental care, EPM, mate guarding and punishment are shared by many species, gossiping and
blackmailing make the human mating system unique.
Background
Cooperation is commonly accompanied by cheating or
defection in a number of naturally occurring social sys-
tems [1-4]. In Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), the popular
model of cooperative behaviour, cooperation is not stable
and defection is the only stable strategy for any player
[5]. However, in iterated PD games strategies involving
reciprocity or reputation can help stabilize cooperation
[5,6]. If the same individuals play the game again, defec-
tion can be retaliated [5]. Furthermore, cooperators can
build a reputation and derive long term gains from it [6].
Cooperation can also evolve if co-operators punish those
who defect [7-9]. However, a potential problem in pun-
ishment is that there is a cost in executing punishment,
which makes punishment an altruistic act. Since the ben-
efits derived by punishing cheaters are shared, there
arises a possibility of second order free riders that coop-
erate but do not contribute to punishment. The second
order free riders can destabilize punishment and coop-
eration in turn. A number of conditional solutions to this
problem have been suggested [8-10].
One of the basic assumptions behind all suggested
solutions to the problem of stability of cooperation is
that the strategies of players and the resulting payoffs are
open at the end of every interaction. Retaliation, punish-
ment or reputation is possible only if players have access
to the history of other players and would fail to work for
games in which the strategies and payoffs remain hidden.
In a number of real life games it is possible that the
players have a choice of secrecy or deception. Evolution
is likely to take a different path when the strategies as
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the time.
The human mating system is an ideal and obvious
example of hidden strategy games. Since paternity is
uncertain the actual reproductive success of a male
remains hidden. For females although some of the compo-
nents of benefits, for example resource partitioning and
the number of offspring borne by them is obvious, the
genetic contributor to the offspring and therefore the ben-
efit of “good genes” remains hidden. It is possible to apply
game theoretic models human mating system considering
faithful long term bi-parental care as cooperation and
extra-pair mating (EPM) or cuckoldry as defection [11]. In
a number of species where biparental care is necessary,
EPM or cuckoldry is known to be common [12-21].
Human marriage system is more complex than other spe-
cies with bi-parental care in that marriage is not only a
game of cooperative partnership but it is a social institu-
tion. Although societal rules differ regarding the allowed
number of spouses at a time [22], long term investment
and faithful commitment by both genders in childcare is
central to the system. Further, faithful monogamy is highly
valued in most cultures. Ther ea r el i k e l yt ob em u l t i p l e
reasons for the evolution of a committed marriage system,
the main reason being the prolonged dependence of the
human child. Biparental care and division of labor is
necessitated by the extreme human newborn altriciality,
demand of multiple simultaneous dependents and longer
period for maturity [23,24]. As a general rule, sexual
dimorphism in size is shaped by the mating system, with
most promiscuous species showing maximum dimorphism
and those with monogamy and biparental care showing lit-
tle dimorphism. In human evolution, size dimorphism is
low through most of the Homo and pre-homo lineage
indicating that mating system could be stable over time. It
is reasonable to assume therefore that monogamy is evolu-
tionarily ancient in hominids [25]. Although biparental
care necessitates cooperation, it may not be sufficient to
maintain faithful monogamy as occult polygamy can con-
fer added genetic benefits to both the genders. Thus, simi-
lar to other species with biparental care, EPM or
cuckoldry is known to occur at varying frequencies in the
human society as well [12,18,20,21,26,27]. In cuckoldry,
the polygamous individuals get an additional genetic
advantage, but their mates have to bear a loss. Males can
increase their number of offspring by indulging in EPM.
The benefits are not in terms of number of offspring for
females. The advantage of EPM for females can be in
terms of additional resource acquisition, sperm competi-
tion or getting dual benefit of good parenting from one
male and good genes from another [20,28-31]. Males suf-
fer a direct genetic loss by their partner’s EPM since their
paternity is threatened [26]. The loss to females is less
obvious since their maternity is never threatened.
However, they may suffer in other ways like loss of the
man’s time, attention, energy, parenting investment, and
commitment [19,21].
The human mating system as a hidden strategy game
differs from the games of incomplete information [32] in
that, not only the strategy and payoff of the other player is
hidden but the payoff of the focal player also remains hid-
den. Since there are few opportunities to learn from pay-
offs, learning is less likely to shape the behaviour but
natural selection would certainly continue to act at the
genetic level. Therefore human sexual behaviour is more
likely to be dominated by instincts rather than learning.
Two types of measures against cuckoldry are seen in the
human society, namely mate guarding [19,20], a trait
shared by many species [33-36], and societal punishment if
cuckoldry gets exposed [11] which appears to be uniquely
human. Although the probability of getting exposed is
small its consequences are known to be severe in most
human societies and exposed adulterous individuals gener-
ally receive punishment in some or the other form. Altruis-
tic punishment or strong reciprocity has been used in the
models of evolution of cooperation [7,8,37]. However,
altruistic punishment suffers from the problem of second
order free riders [37,38]. In the human mating system
t h e r ec a nb ean o n - a l t r u i s t i cp u n i s h m e n ti nt h ef o r mo f
social sanctions. If an adulterous individual is deserted by
its partner who makes the reason public, the probability of
pairing again could be very small for the deserted indivi-
dual, a form of ostracism or community boycott [39,40].
While for the deserting partner, if the probability and the
net benefit of pairing again is higher than the net benefit
from continuing partnership with a known defector,
deserting would be a non-altruistic way of punishing.
Avoiding pairing with a known defector is also a non-
altruistic act. Therefore, punishment for cuckoldry by the
partner as well as by the society need not have an altruistic
element in it at least in its minimal form. More complex
punishment systems appear to have evolved in complex
societies but the basic form of minimal punishment in
terms of social sanctions can be considered non-altruistic.
However, since individuals have the choice of secrecy, if
the probability of getting exposed remains small, punish-
ment may fail to curb EPM. The stability of monogamy
would depend upon mechanisms to increase the probabil-
ity of exposure. In humans, due to evolution of language,
gossip is possible through which one can gain information
about the behaviour of a sexual partner in one’s absence.
In fact the need to gossip has been argued to be one of the
major selective forces for the evolution of language [41].
This is an indirectly reciprocating, apparently altruistic
social act that forms a component of ‘social policing’.
Social policing consists of making observations about
others’ EPM and its indicators on the one hand and gos-
siping about it on the other. The cost involved in social
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dual mate guarding. This is because in individual mate
guarding one has to compromise on foraging and other
activities for keeping a watch on the mate, while social
policing is more of an incidental act which an individual
does during its regular activities resulting in lower costs.
However, as long as there is a non-zero cost of social poli-
cing some second order free riders can take advantage of
the system. Individuals who do not contribute to social
policing may still gain from it by getting information
about their sexual partner. Such free riders can destabilize
social policing.
We suggest here that opportunistic blackmailing can
give a solution to the problem. Since the strategies are hid-
den, and exposure can lead to punishment, blackmailing is
possible. When defection is exposed to only one or a few
individuals the defector may give some form of direct ben-
efits to the blackmailer and avoid social punishment. Since
blackmailing necessarily depends upon differential secrecy,
it is restricted to hidden strategy games. We use the defini-
tion of blackmailing given by Blocks [42], which is the
demand for money or other valuable consideration,
coupled with an offer to refrain from exposing a secret
which is embarrassing to the blackmailee. The success of
blackmailing is highly conditional, but whenever the con-
ditions favour blackmailing, it can give direct returns on
investment in policing. Policing without blackmailing is an
altruistic act and will be selected against in the presence of
blackmailers. For a policing individual, the opportunities
to blackmail increase with increasing investment in social
policing, in particular the observation component of poli-
cing. Since non-policing individuals are less likely to get a
blackmailing opportunity, free riders are unlikely to thrive.
All individuals engaged in EPM, on the other hand, have
to bear a probabilistic penalty as a result of social punish-
ments or blackmailing. Thus, opportunistic blackmailing
makes social policing a credible threat. We show here that
inclusion of blackmailing in a hidden strategy game leads
to stable or oscillatory coexistence of different strategies,
where cooperation is maintained at high proportions. On
the other hand omission of blackmailing from the model
leads to collapse of the policing and punishment systems
and occult polygamy is the only ESS possible. We have
further shown that constraints on blackmailing, imposed
by the social norms and judiciary systems, do not affect
the results of the model.
Methods
Model
Our model assumes a “marriage system” in which every
individual player has to engage in a cooperative and com-
mitted parenting act. We use the word monogamy here to
indicate faithful and committed partnership. The central
concept would be applicable also to societies where more
than one spouses are allowed as long as there is faithful
committed parenting but we assume one spouse partner-
ship in the model to avoid complexity. The baseline model
assumes that all individuals are socially monogamous, but
they can become genetically polygamous by engaging in
EPM. Players have a choice to desert and probabilistically
pair again exerting a choice to deny pairing with indivi-
duals with a bad reputation. Individual players in the
model can have alternative behavioral options on four dif-
ferent lines. Individuals can be (i) genetically monogamous
(M
+) i.e. co-operators or polygamous (M
-) i.e. defectors (ii)
guarding (G
+)o rn o n - g u a r d i n g( G
-) (iii) policing (P
+)o r
non-policing (P
-) and (iv) blackmailers or non-blackmai-
lers. Where, policing trait includes both observation and
gossiping. Combinations of the above traits give 16 differ-
ent behavioral options. However, policing without black-
mailing is at an all time disadvantage as compared to
policing blackmailers. This is because policing is an
altruistic act and therefore blackmailing police always
invade altruistic police as long as there is a non-zero posi-
tive benefit of blackmailing. On the other hand since
blackmailing can be done only if the individuals have
selective information, and policing is the best way to gain
information, non-policing blackmailers are unlikely to
survive. This results into an obligate association between
policing and blackmailing and leaves only 8 pure strategies
in the game viz.M
+G
+P
+,M
+G
-P
+,M
+G
-P
-,M
+G
+P
-,M
-
G
+P
+,M
-G
-P
+,M
-G
-P
- and M
-G
+P
- where P
+ are policing
individuals who are also involved in opportunistic black-
mailing while P
- are non policing non blackmailers
(Table 1).
We assume that the fitness of both the partners in a
strictly monogamous, non-guarding, non-policing pair is
unity. This is taken as the baseline fitness for the model.
All polygamous individuals have an additional maximum
possible advantage z as a result of extra pair mating. In
practice z is limited by the opportunities for EPM which
are proportional to the availability of polygamous sexual
partners ready for EPM. The partners of individuals
indulging in EPM have to bear a loss l.T h el o s sl could
consist of several components including direct genetic
loss due to cuckoldry or loss in parenting resources com-
ing from the partner. If the population is perceived as
obligately paired individuals, EPM cannot be a one sided
act. The probability of getting an EPM partner will
depend upon the proportion of opportunistically polyga-
mous individuals. Therefore the realized benefit (z)a n d
loss (l) would be proportional to polygamous individuals.
The loss from cuckoldry for any individual depends on
the proportion of adulterous individuals in a dual way.
The probability of one’s partner being polygamous as
well as the probability that he/she gets an EPM partner
both depend on it. However, if we depart from the ideal
population where each individual is in a partnership,
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virgin individuals or immigrants, there could be some
benefit of EPM even in the absence of other polygamous
individuals.
Individuals actively guarding their mates incur a cost of
guarding cG, and as a result of guarding could reduce their
loss l by a fraction s. It is obvious that guarding would
exist only if l.s >cG. We assume that the cost of policing cP
<cG since for individual mate guarding one has to give
extra efforts for watching the mate, while social policing is
incidental to the regular activities. The benefit of social
policing a is availed by all individuals alike and is assumed
to be directly proportional to the fraction of policing indi-
viduals in the society. Thus, the loss l is reduced in pro-
portion to fraction of policing individuals in the society.
Reciprocally, for polygamous individuals their benefit z is
reduced by a fraction s when the partner is guarding. As a
result of social policing, there is a reduction b in the suc-
cess of cuckoldry that is directly proportional to the frac-
tion of policing individuals in the society. Policing has a
dual function, as on the one hand it prevents EPM; on the
other it exposes adultery. The adulterous individuals are
assumed to get a punishment y if exposed, the probability
of which is in direct proportion to the fraction of policing
individuals in the society. The term y includes the prob-
ability of being exposed and receiving punishment, the
direct loss in reproduction owing to deserting by the part-
ner, a bad reputation resulting into reduced probability of
pairing again or alternatively the probability of being
blackmailed. For a policing individual the opportunities to
blackmail are assumed to increase linearly with the
number of polygamous individuals in the population.
Hence, blackmailing could give direct returns to the poli-
cing individuals proportional to the fraction of all polyga-
mous individuals, the proportionality constant being a.
We keep a<ythroughout the model.
If we assume that the entire population consists of
socially monogamous pairs with no immigration or emi-
gration, we can maintain consistency in the payoff struc-
ture as suggested by Houston and McNamara [43,44],
by keeping z = l and a = b.H o w e v e r ,w eh a v ec h o s e n
to use different symbols for benefits (z and a) and losses
(l and b) to maintain the flexibility in terms of model-
ling so as to study the effect of non consistent payoffs.
Non-consistent pay-offs are possible if the population
has virgin individuals, sex ratio is skewed or there is
immigration or emigration.
A player could have a mating strategy with varying
degrees of monogamy, guarding and policing traits. In
other words players can adapt strategies in continuous
strategic space. Each player is characterized by a strategy
consisting of three probabilities (p, q, r) Î [0, 1]
3, p being
the probability that a person behaved monogamously, q
the probability that the person guarded his/her mate and r
the probability that the person was involved in social poli-
cing and opportunistic blackmailing. Thus, the payoff of a
person using a strategy (p1, q1, r1) in a population using
the strategy (p0, q0, r0) would be
E

(p1,q1,r1)|(p0,q0,r0)

= p1(1) + (1 − p1)(1 + z(1 − p0)) + (1 − p0)2(−l)+q1(−cG)+q1(1 − p0)2(l.s)
+q0(1 − p1)(−z(1 − p0).s)+r1(−cP)+r0(1 − p0)2(α.l)
+r0(1 − p1)(−β.z(1 − p0)) + r0(1 − p1)(1 − p0)(−y) + r1(1 − p0)2(a)
(1)
All possible combinations of the (p, q, r) strategy can
be represented by a unit cube where the corners are the
eight pure strategies we discussed earlier while any
other combination of (p, q, r) strategy that lie on the
edges or in the interior of the cube is a mixed strategy
of the game.
We will study the model under two scenarios. First,
assuming that the gains and losses do not vary across gen-
der we will study how monogamous traits will invade the
population using invasion dynamics and adaptive
dynamics. If sexes do not differ in payoffs and sex ratio is
unity, the two sexes need not be modeled separately. Sec-
ond, by considering that the gains and losses differ for
genders we will study the gender difference model using
replicator dynamics where the dynamics of the two sexes
needs to be modeled separately.
Invasion dynamics
Invasion of population using one pure strategy by a
mutant using another pure strategy was determined
using the logic of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS)
proposed by Maynard Smith and Price [45]. A rare
mutant strategy j will invade a population of players
Table 1 List of parameters with description and symbol
Description Symbol
Genetically monogamous individual M
+
Genetically polygamous individual M
-
Player engaged in individual mate guarding G
+
Player who does not do individual mate guarding G
-
Player involved in policing and opportunistic blackmailing P
+
Player not involved in policing and blackmailing P
-
Probability that a player is genetically monogamous p
Probability that a player guards its mate q
Probability that a player is involved in social policing and
blackmailing
r
Additional payoff due to EPM z
Loss due to the partner’s EPM l
Cost of guarding one’s own mate cG
Reduction in l because of mate guarding s
Cost of social policing cP
Benefits from cooperative social policing a
Reduction in cuckoldry due to social policing b
Punishment penalty to punished individual y
Benefits of opportunistic blackmailing a
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of i, i.e. E[j|i], followed the inequity E[j|i]> E[i|i].
Adaptive dynamics
We used adaptive dynamics [46] formulated as a differ-
ential equation in the space of all strategies [47] to
understand the dynamics of all mixed strategies in the
game. Let there be n different behavioral options for
each player and each strategy can be described by some
continuous parameters p1,...,pn,w h e r epi Î [0, 1]
n,a n d
that the entire population plays strategy S=S (p1,..., pn ).
The expected payoff received by a mutant S’ =S ’(p’1,...,
p’n) is given by E[S’|S]. The adaptive dynamics are given
by the full system of differential equations
˙ pi =
∂E

S |S

∂p 
i
 
 

S →S
(2)
Where i = 1,2,...n. The system of differential equations
for the human mating game using payoff structure in
equation (1) can be given as follows,
˙ p =( 1− p)

ry − z(1 − s.q − β.r)

(3)
˙ q = −cG + l.s(1 − p)2 (4)
˙ r = −cP + a(1 − p)2 (5)
These differential equations can be used in adaptive
dynamics framework to understand the evolution of tri-
plet strategies.
Replicator dynamics
Because of the limitations in representing the results of
the adaptive dynamics for higher dimensional system,
we could not use adaptive dynamics for gender differ-
ence model as it meant that we had to deal with total
16 strategies, 8 each for males and females. We there-
fore used replicator dynamics to study gender difference
model. Using payoff structure given in equation (1) the
linear fitness functions Ei =

j fjE[i|j] was derived
where fj is the frequency of players using strategy j.T o
simulate how frequencies of the players using the given
strategy changed, we used replicator equation
˙ fi = fi(Ei − ¯ E) [ref. [46]]. The replicator equation
describes deterministic but frequency-dependent selec-
tion dynamics. The fitness, Ei,o ft y p ei is a function of
the frequencies of all strategies (phenotypes)
 
f=( f1,f2,......,fn). The average payoff of the population
is given by ¯ E =

i fiEi . Two genders, males and females,
were assumed and there was random pairing between
individuals of opposite genders. We assumed different
costs (l)a n db e n e f i t s( z)o fE P Mf o rt h et w og e n d e r s .
Since the fitness values can be considered as gender spe-
cific relative fitness scores, it is not necessary for the
gender difference model that the average fitness of
males and females remains the same.
Results
Dynamics between the pure strategies
Invasion dynamics between 8 pure strategies (Figure 1)
shows that each strategy can invade at least one other
strategy and gets invaded by at least one other strategy
with the exception of M
+G
-P
-.M
+G
-P
- is a local or
unstable equilibrium since in this pure population a
polygamous invader will fail to find an EPM partner and
therefore can get no advantage. However, since M
-G
-P
-
h a st h es a m ef i t n e s si naM
+G
-P
- population, invader
m a yg r o wb yd r i f ta l o n e .W i th adequate proportion of
the invader, the benefit of polygamy would allow inva-
sion by M
-G
-P
-. In the presence of polygamy both
guarding and policing traits have an advantage and start
increasing. Mate guarding increases because guarding
one’s own mate reduces the chances of defection by the
partner. Policing trait increases because it gives an
opportunistic benefit of blackmailing. If the benefit of
blackmailing is more than the cost of policing (a >cP)
Figure 1 Invasion dynamics of 8 pure strategies. Black arrows
indicate that invasion is possible through basic assumptions of the
model. Grey arrows indicate that invasion is possible only under
certain conditions. Arrows point at the invading strategy. The circled
strategy is an unstable equilibrium. The hollow arrow indicates that
the payoff of a lone invader is the same as the population, however
even with slight drift invasion is possible.
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guarding policing trait M
-G
+P
+. If the punishment is
sufficiently large (y >z(1-s-b)), then M
+G
+P
+ can invade
the population. However an obligate monogamous
guarding and policing strategy M
+G
+P
+ is vulnerable to
invasion by strategies which do not have policing or
guarding traits. This is because, in the absence of poly-
gamy costly guarding and policing is selected against. As
a result, in the absence of polygamy, policing and guard-
ing traits disappear increasing the proportion of M
+G
-P
-
and the cycle continues. As a result when the condition
y >z(1-s-b) is satisfied all the eight strategies coexist in
oscillations. But if y is still larger such that y >z(1-b)
then only four strategies namely, M
+G
-P
+,M
+G
-P
-,M
-
G
-P
+,a n dM
-G
-P
- oscillate. The last result suggests that
monogamy can be maintained even in the absence of
mate guarding but in the presence of social policing and
opportunistic blackmailing.
Dynamics in mixed strategy space
We will now explore the dynamics of the entire strategic
space. Simple analytical solutions reveal that in the
absence of punishment and blackmailing (y =0 ,a =0 ) ,
the unique equilibrium of the game consists of the strat-
egy (0, 1, 0) (Figure 2A). This could be depicted from
equations (3), (4) and (5). At a =0 ,r approached zero
for any cP >0 ,s oa l s o ,a sr.b.z ® 0, p also approached
zero since q.z.s <z for every 1 ≥ q ≥ 0a n ds <1 .H o w -
ever, as we assumed that l.s >cG, q increases in the
population and gets fixed. Similarly, in the presence of
punishment but absence of blackmailing (y >0 ,a =0 )
the equilibrium is fixed at (0, 1, 0) where both r and p
approach zero for any cP >0a n d1≥ q ≥ 0, s <1 ,w h i l e
q increases in the population and gets fixed at q =1
(Figure 2B). The only difference in the later case as
compared to the former case is that monogamy invades
polygamous population if the initial population of poli-
cing individuals is very high. However, this invasion is
temporary since r always decreases and in the absence
of policing monogamy fails to establish in the popula-
tion. Thus, the only stable equilibrium in both the cases
is (p, q, r) = (0, 1, 0).
If both punishment and blackmailing options are pre-
sent (y >0 ,a >0 )t h e nn os i n g l es t r a t e g yi sa nE S S ,
given that the punishment is greater than the advantage
of polygamy, i.e. y >z(1-b-s), and the benefit of black-
mailing is more than the cost of policing, a >cP (Figure
2C, 3A). In this case the probabilities p, q and r keep on
oscillating. We can analyze this from equations (3), (4)
and (5). When p is small, derivative of r is positive as
policing individuals get side payments in terms of black-
mailing. However, as p increase, both q and r decrease
as there is no cheater to guard or police so the cost of
guarding and policing was worthless. However, at low
Figure 2 Vector field plots of differential equations (2), (3) and
(4). (A) in the absence of punishment and blackmailing (y =0 ,a =
0), (B) in the presence of punishment but no blackmailing (y >0 ,a
= 0) and (C) in the presence of punishment and blackmailing (y >0 ,
a > 0). Arrows indicate the direction of change in strategy. Grey
circle indicates unstable equilibrium and black circle indicates stable
equilibrium. (A) and (B) end up at the stable equilibrium (0,1,0)
whereas (C) leads to cyclic oscillations in strategies with no ESS.
Other parameter values are l = z = 0.2, a = b = 0.2, cP = 0.01, cG =
0.02, y = 0.1, s = 0.4 and a = 0.08.
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which further encourages guarding and policing traits in
the population and the cycle continues (Figure 3B).
In the above three situations we considered functional
mate guarding strategy that conferred a non zero posi-
tive benefit s to the guarding individual. We will now
consider that there is no guarding (s =0 ) ,h o w e v e r ,
there are punishment and blackmailing options (y >0 ,a
> 0). If the punishment is sufficiently large, i.e. y >z(1-
b), and the benefit of blackmailing is more than the cost
of policing, a >cP both monogamy and policing traits
oscillate and monogamy is maintained at high frequency
(Figure 3C). The result can be studied analytically by
considering equations (3) and (5). When r is large and y
>z(1-b), p evolves and goes to unity. When p is unity,
derivative of r is negative as cP >0 .O n c er decreases p
also decreases. Decrease in p again increases r and the
cycle continues (Figure 3D). This indicates that punish-
ment and policing-blackmailing are both necessary and
sufficient for the oscillatory coexistence of monogamy
and polygamy. Mate guarding, on the other hand is
helpful by reducing the critical y necessary for the result
but does not stabilize monogamy by itself.
In all the situations there exists an unstable equili-
brium at (1,0,0). If p is slightly perturbed the system
does not return to (1,0,0). The unstable equilibrium cri-
tically depends on the assumption that EPM is impossi-
ble without other adulterous individuals in the
population. If this assumption is slightly relaxed, the
unstable equilibrium vanishes.
The oscillatory behavior between strategies can be
interpreted in two ways. We can consider that the pro-
portions of strategies used by mixed strategy players
oscillate, however, since p, q, r are population frequen-
cies, at the oscillatory equilibrium we can also consider
that different pure strategies coexist where the total pro-
portion of monogamous individuals, guarding indivi-
duals and policing individuals is p, q and r respectively.
Figure 3 Blackmailing leads to cyclic oscillations in the mixed strategies in the presence (A and B) and absence (C and D) of mate
guarding. (A) In the presence of mate guarding, all three traits, i.e. monogamy, mate guarding and policing show stable oscillations which form
limit cycle (B) in p-q-r space. (C) In the absence of mate guarding monogamy and policing still oscillate in stable oscillations, which form a limit
cycle (D) in p-r space. All parameter values are as per Figure 2 except in (C) and (D) y = 0.2, s = 0. Arrows indicate direction of change.
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We will now refine our model to capture two scenarios (i)
blackmailing opportunities decrease with increase in mate
guarding and (ii) blackmailing opportunities for an indivi-
dual decrease with increase in blackmailing individuals. In
the basic model we considered that the opportunity to
blackmail depend only upon the frequency of polygamous
individuals (1-p), however, it can also be argued that
blackmailing will decrease with mate guarding (q) as this
would lead to decrease in EPM. We will consider that
opportunity and benefits of blackmailing decrease with
mate guarding by replacing ‘a’ with ‘a(1-q)’ in equation
(5). Vector field plot of modified equations (Figure 4A) is
qualitatively similar to Figure 2C. Furthermore, in a
refined model we can also consider that the benefit of
blackmailing decreases with increase in the frequency of
blackmailing individuals. To capture this situation we can
replaced ‘a’ with ‘a(1-r)’ in equation (5). Vector field plot
of modified equation (Figure 4B) is also qualitatively simi-
lar to Figure 2C. If we consider both the refinements
together by replacing a with a(1-q)(1-r) the results are still
qualitatively similar to Figure 2C (results not shown). This
demonstrates the robustness of the model.
Gender differences
Assuming different costs and benefits of EPM for the two
genders makes the model more complex and therefore we
use a simulation approach. Simulations of the two-gender
model were identical to the non-gender model if para-
meters for both the genders were kept identical. Introdu-
cing gender differences in the model resulted into
different proportions of traits in the two genders; never-
theless, polymorphism existed in both the genders. Inter-
estingly satisfying the condition y >z (1-b -s) in only one of
the genders was sufficient for polymorphism in both gen-
ders. Difference in l, z or y alone or in combination led to
substantial gender difference. If males were assumed to
have greater losses due to partner’sE P M( l) and additional
payoff due to their own EPM (z) and/or smaller penalty of
punishment (y), there was greater proportion of polygamy
in males as compared to females. A difference in benefit of
blackmailing (a), on the other hand was unable to induce
substantial difference in the proportion of traits across
genders. The model therefore expects that there can be
gender differences in the tendency for engaging in EPM
but there need not be a gender difference in the involve-
ment in gossiping and blackmailing.
Discussion
In humans, marriage has evolved as an institution in
which interpersonal relationships are acknowledged by
the society. Social pressure to reinforce faithful mono-
gamy is predominantly and perhaps uniquely human.
Active mate guarding is exhibited by many species
showing bi-parental care but the element of social poli-
cing has not been demonstrated in non-humans so far.
From historical times and across widely different cul-
tures, individuals involved in EPM have been threatened
by punishment ranging from community boycott to
death, given that they are caught. The societal compo-
nent of reinforcing monogamy is certainly language
dependent. Language can help in gaining information
about one’sm a t ei no n e ’s absence given that there is
social policing against EPM. Social policing is a group
beneficial trait and it is less costly than mate guarding,
Figure 4 Variations of the model to incorporate constraints on
blackmailing opportunity, where (a) blackmailing opportunity
decreases with increase in the mate guarding, and (b)
blackmailing opportunity decreases with increase in policing
individuals. In both the cases, the results are qualitatively similar in
that blackmailing leads to cyclic oscillations in strategies with no
ESS similar to Figure 2C. Arrows indicate the direction of change in
strategy. All parameter values as per Figure 2.
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can always free ride on the benefits gained from social
policing by others without contributing to social poli-
cing. Therefore the evolution and stability of social poli-
cing is a possible paradox. The possibility of side
payments from blackmailing effectively resolves the
paradox. Blackmailing need not actually happen with
very high frequency but the incentive to blackmail can
stabilize policing and in turn monogamy in the
population.
We showed that only two conditions were essential for
the continued existence of obligate monogamy. First was
that the maximum probabilistic cost of punishment was
greater than the advantage of polygamy i.e. y >z(1-b-s)a n d
second, the maximum probabilistic benefit of blackmailing
was greater than the cost of policing (a >cP). We assumed
that the benefits of mate guarding were more than the
cost (l.s >cG) to stabilize mate guarding in the system.
However, mate guarding alone was neither necessary nor
sufficient to stabilize monogamy. Punishment and poli-
cing, stabilized by blackmailing opportunity was on the
other hand both necessary and sufficient for the continued
existence of obligate monogamy (Figure 2C).
A tam o r es u b t l el e v e li tm a yb ea r g u e dt h a to n l yt h e
observation component of social policing gives blackmail-
ing opportunities, not the gossiping component. The gos-
siping component would actually eliminate secrecy and
make blackmailing impossible. Therefore individuals may
invest only in the observational component and there
would be competition for obtaining blackmailing worthy
secrets but no motivation for gossiping. There would
indeed be competition to discover blackmail worthy
secrets, but such can be obtained in a very limited set of
conditions. Whenever situation does not permit black-
mailing, the information canb ef r e e l yg o s s i p e da r o u n d
since there is nothing to lose. This apart from accruing
the broadly socially accepted good also serves the purpose
of demonstrating the cost of social punishments. Social
punishment relies on making the information public by
gossiping. This would work as a threat useful in blackmail-
ing. Individuals may build reputation as highly vocal and
influential gossipers and such individuals pose a greater
threat of initiating social punishment. Unless there is
some demonstrated threat of punishment, the rare oppor-
tunity of blackmailing is unlikely to be fruitful. Gossiping
therefore helps blackmailing rather than weakening it.
As per the suggestion of Houston and McNamara
[43,44], where the loss and gains from EPM tally, we
maintained consistency in the payoff structure for all the
simulations presented in the paper. However, in reality,
strict consistency may not be maintained especially when
population is open with virgin individuals, immigrants,
emigrants and skewed sex ratios. Our analysis suggests
that whether the payoffs are consistent or non-consistent
does not change the dynamics of the model so long as the
conditions mentioned in the invasion dynamics and Figure
1 are obeyed.
In important issue regarding the policing and gossiping
to be effective is to understand why polygamous indivi-
duals should be involved in this activity. For a polygamous
individual, there is no primary incentive since the possible
benefits of indirect mate guarding can be obliterated by
the probability of its own exposure. However, for monoga-
mous individuals there can be only benefit and no loss due
to exposure. Therefore measures to increase the probabil-
ity of exposure can be initiated by obligately monogamous
individuals. However, if this happens, very soon gossiping
could become an identifier of monogamy. As a result poly-
gamous individuals will be compelled to support the gos-
sip to pretend to be monogamous.
It can also be argued that policing individuals can be
given a benefit through some collectively agreed policy
that someone who discovers an EPM incident gets
rewarded. However, such reward policies seldom evolve
cooperation [48]. One of the basic problems is that there
is a cost in giving reward. Individuals may shirk from con-
tributing to reward and this will lead to second order free
rider problem. Therefore policing cannot be stabilized by
any other forms of reward.
Blackmailing is illegal and is considered as a crime liable
for judiciary punishment in societies with formal judiciary
system. However, prior to such central judiciary system,
blackmailing might have been used as a private justice
[49,50]. We therefore argue that during the evolution of
mating systems, which is considered as a main driving
force for the evolution of human social system [51], mono-
gamy was maintained by social policing with opportunistic
blackmailing. It can be speculated that after the advent of a
formal judiciary system, the private justice of blackmailing
could have been perceived as a threat to the formal judi-
ciary system and therefore considered bad and illegal.
However, formal police and judiciary systems could never
replace social policing through gossiping and opportunistic
blackmailing both of which are prevalent in modern socie-
ties too. Blackmailing by itself is a defection on the social
policing and punishment system. But the defection itself
stabilizes cooperation, a result similar to that of Dahanukar
and Watve [52] who showed that in classical PD, refine-
ment of defection strategies stabilizes cooperation.
In our baseline model we assumed that there is no gen-
der difference in benefits of EPM and losses due to part-
ner’s EPM. The introduction of gender differences in the
model results into different proportions of strategies in
the two genders at a given time but stable or oscillating
polymorphism is seen in both the genders provided our
key conditions, y >z(1-b-s)a n da >cP, are obeyed by at
least one gender. This is interesting since in many socie-
ties there is a gender bias in punishment for cuckoldry.
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spite of the gender bias, although it is not a justification
for having a gender bias. It is known that the psychology
of deception, the nature of gains and losses from EPM
and the nature of sexual jealousy vary between sexes
[20,21] and the model allows for these differences.
Our model is on the interface of genetic and cultural
evolution. While the payoffs of reproduction are genetic,
policing and punishment may be influenced by both genes
and culture and further superimposed by the evolution of
language in humans. Although the model is Darwinian, it
does not predict gender stereotypes. Instead it predicts
both within and between gender variability. Since some of
the parameters such as the severity of punishment are
decided by culture, and these parameters decide the equili-
brium proportions, the model also allows for cross cultural
variability. It is difficult to determine whether the observed
variability in behavior with respect to EPM is intrinsic (dif-
ferences in individual inclinations) or extrinsic (differences
in opportunities to indulge in EPM) or both. Nevertheless
the model is perhaps the first of Darwinian models that
predicts intrinsic variation in inclinations towards EPM
within as well as between genders.
Our model suggests that obligate monogamy can exist in
the human population, which needs to be differentiated
from monogamy imposed by the lack of opportunity. An
obligately monogamous individual will not indulge in
EPM even if opportunity permits. The model indicates
that obligate monogamy is made possible by blackmailing.
In reality how much is the relative contribution of obligate
monogamy and that of opportunity limitation to human
monogamy is not yet clear. Although monogamous breed-
ing with biparental care exists in animal species, extra pair
paternity has been demonstrated in various proportions in
many species [53]. The question whether the observed
monogamy in these species is obligate or opportunity lim-
ited has not yet been addressed. However, since blackmail-
ing is uniquely human, we expect obligate monogamy in
human rather than animal mating systems.
Conclusions
The model shows that in spite of the potential advantages
of EPM, intrinsically driven obligate monogamy can be
maintained in a population. Mate guarding is neither
necessary nor sufficient to stabilize obligate monogamy,
but social policing strengthened by opportunistic black-
mailing is both necessary and sufficient to stabilize obli-
gate monogamy. Blackmailing makes policing a non-
altruistic act and thereby stabilizes policing. Stability of
policing is crucial for long term coexistence of multiple
strategies, with faithful monogamy comprising substantial
part of the population. In the absence of blackmailing
polygamy with mate guarding is the only stable strategy.
Although biparental care,E P M ,m a t eg u a r d i n ga n d
punishment are shared by many species, gossiping and
blackmailing make the human mating system unique.
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